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Comparators in Marital Status Discrimination: 
General or Specifi c?
?
Johannes Chan*
Discrimination can be broadly defi ned as indefensible differential treatment 
based on certain prohibited grounds. It is implicit in the concept of differential 
treatment to have a comparator who is in similar or not materially different 
circumstances. It is argued that it is not always possible to fi nd an appropri-
ate comparator in the context of marital status discrimination, and a liberal 
and holistic approach is called for in the case of hiring or dismissal involving 
a spouse. The article concludes with some refl ections on when such hiring or 
dismissal decisions could be justifi ed, and points out that while a liberal and 
holistic approach is desirable, the present statutory regime may not permit such 
an analysis in the case of direct discrimination, and that the court will fi nd itself 
engaged in a tortuous and artifi cial comparator analysis to avoid a fi nding of 
discrimination when the differential treatment may be justifi ed.
Introduction
One of the most diffi cult issues in discrimination cases is to fi nd a suitable 
comparator in order to show that there is differential treatment. Some-
times a suitable comparator – real or hypothetical – may simply not exist. 
Sometimes the only comparator available has features that are specifi c to 
the case in question only. This issue arose in the recent case of Wong Lai 
Wan Avril v The Prudential Assurance Co Ltd.1 
In that case, the plaintiff and her husband, Mr Andy Leung, were 
both employed as insurance agents by the fi rst defendant. On or about 
6 Apr 2006, the fi rst defendant terminated the agency relationship 
with Mr Leung. On the same date, the plaintiff ’s employment was 
also terminated allegedly on the sole ground that the plaintiff was the 
wife of Mr Leung. There was evidence that the fi rst defendant had 
no complaint against the quality of the work or performance of the 
plaintiff. After abortive attempts to settle the dispute and after the 
* SC (Hon), Professor and Dean, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong. I would like to 
thank my colleague Professor Michael Tilbury and the anonymous reviewer for their valuable 
comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to my colleagues Kelley Loper and Puja Kapai 
for their insightful discussion on the issues in this article.
1 [2009] 5 HKC 494.
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Equal Opportunities Commission had refused to provide legal assis-
tance, presumably on the ground of a lack of merits, the plaintiff took 
out a claim of marital status and family status discrimination under the 
Sex Discrimination Ordinance2 and the Family Status Discrimination 
Ordinance3 against the defendants. The defendants then applied to 
strike out the claim on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause 
of action. They argued, inter alia, that there was no marital status dis-
crimination as the defendants would have done the same to Mr Leung 
if the plaintiff were to be dismissed, and that the defendants would not 
have dismissed any other wives or persons with a similar marital status 
had they not been related to Mr Leung.4 In this regard, there was a 
concession from the plaintiff that she had not been treated less favour-
ably than any other person with a similar marital status. Her case was 
that she was treated less favourably merely because she was married to 
Mr Leung and no one else. 
There are two issues. The fi rst is whether the dismissal of the plaintiff 
was due to her marital status as a wife in general, which she may have 
diffi culty to establish as other persons with a different marital status were 
not dismissed,5 or whether the dismissal was due to her marital status as a 
wife married to a particular person only, in which case it would be diffi cult 
to fi nd a comparator to show a differential treatment. The second issue is 
that if there is a differential treatment based on her specifi c marital sta-
tus, whether the differential treatment would constitute discrimination 
at all. This may bring into question the legitimacy of hiring and dismissal 
policy in a number of industries. While these are conceptually two dif-
ferent issues, this article will argue that they could not be separated from 
one another when a comparator group is not readily identifi able.
An Appropriate Comparator
 Section 7 of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance prohibits direct and indi-
rect discrimination, defi ned as less favourable treatment on the ground of 
one’s marital status. Marital status is defi ned to mean the “state or condi-
tion of being single, married, married but living separately and apart from 
2 Cap 480, occasionally referred to hereinafter as SDO.
3 Cap 527.
4 The other main argument is that the dismissal had nothing to do with family status as the 
status of being a wife is not the same as family status. This point will not be pursued in this 
article.
5 See Chang Ying Kwan v Wyeth [2001] 2 HKC 129 at 135, citing with approval Chief Constable of 
West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2000] IRLR 324.
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one’s spouse, divorced, or widowed”.6 Section 10 further provides that a 
comparison of cases of persons of different marital status under s 7 shall 
be such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or 
not materially different, in the other. The issue here is whether “marital 
status” is a general concept or whether it could apply to the “marital 
status” of a particular person, such as marriage to Mr Andy Leung, which 
is the sole reason for the plaintiff ’s dismissal and which is not a factor 
that could easily be attributed to any hypothetical comparator. In other 
words, who could be a proper comparator in such cases so that the rel-
evant circumstances are “the same or not materially different”?
There are two different lines of cases which attempt to answer this 
question. The Australian approach, as set out in Boehringer Ingelheim Pty 
Ltd v Reddrop7 and Waterhouse v Bell,8 is that unlawful discrimination on 
the ground of marital status does not extend to proscribe discrimination 
based upon the identity or situation of a person’s spouse. In contrast, 
the Canadian approach, as represented by B v Ontario (Human Rights 
Commission),9 is that the concept of “marital status” should encompass 
circumstances where the discrimination results from the particular iden-
tity of the complainant’s spouse. Hence, it is suffi cient that the individual 
experiences differential treatment on the basis of an irrelevant personal 
characteristic that is proscribed in the Ontario Human Rights Code.
The Australian Approach
In Boehringer, the plaintiff applied unsuccessfully for a position in a phar-
maceutical company. The position was offered to someone with lesser 
qualifi cation than her, and the reason for her unsuccessful application 
was that her husband worked for a rival company. She claimed to be 
a victim of sex discrimination on the ground of her marital status and 
argued that “marital status” did not merely denote her status or condition 
of being married but was extended to embrace the identity and situation 
of her spouse. Section 39(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 pro-
vides that “a person discriminates against another person on the ground 
of his marital status if, on the ground of (a) his marital status; (b) a char-
acteristic that appertains generally to persons of his marital status; or (c) 
a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons of his marital status, 
6 SDO, s 2.
7 [1984] 2 NSWLR 13.
8 [1991] 25 NSWLR 99.
9 [2002] 3 SCR 403 at 429, paras 56–57.
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he treats him less favourably than in the same circumstances, or in cir-
cumstances which are not materially different, he treats or would treat 
a person of a different marital status.” The New South Wales Court of 
Appeal held that the defi nition was exhaustive, and once the three situ-
ations were taken together, they would not allow any room for a further 
extension of the defi nition to embrace the particular situation or condi-
tion of one’s spouse.10 The legislature had already expanded the concept 
to include discrimination based on characteristics that appertained gen-
erally or were generally imputed to persons of the relevant marital status, 
sometimes known as “stereotyped assumptions”. The statutory defi nition 
did not go beyond that to include characteristics or conditions that were 
not generally appertained or imputed to persons of the relevant marital 
status, in this case, a husband working for a rival company.
This is a classic literal approach to interpreting a statutory provision. 
Given the nature and purpose of sex discrimination legislation, a formal-
istic approach of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is hardly appropriate.11 
While Boehringer was followed in Waterhouse v Bell, the Court of Appeal 
managed to reach a different conclusion. In this case, the plaintiff was 
refused a trainer’s licence because she was married to a person who had 
been warned off every racecourse in Australia and elsewhere. Without 
expressing its view on Boehringer,12 the court was prepared to proceed 
on the concession of both parties that Boehringer was correctly decided. 
However, the court reformulated the question in this way: the plaintiff 
would fail if the reason for her unsuccessful application was that she was 
the wife of the notorious gambler or if the dismissal was based on a risk 
of disclosure of confi dential information by inadvertence, but she would 
succeed if the reason was that as a wife she was more susceptible to be 
corrupted by her husband! This became a stereotyped assumption of all 
wives and hence there was discrimination on the ground of marital sta-
tus. While this is an innovative approach to get round Boehringer, the 
distinction is subtle if not spurious, as it can easily be said in Boehringer 
that the wife was refused the position because a wife would be liable to 
leak confi dential information to her husband and hence there was a ste-
reotyped assumption of married persons as well.13 It is unfortunate that 
10 [1984] 2 NSWLR 13 at 14, per Moffi tt P; 21–22, per Mahoney JA; 24, per Pristley JA.
11 Mentioning of one or more things of a particular class may be regarded as silently excluding all 
other members of the class.
12 (1991) 25 NSWLR 99 at 105. The court found it unfair to criticise Pristley JA’s judgment 
that he intended to exclude cases when there were mixed reasons for discrimination: see 
(1991) 25 NSWLR 99 at 105, per Clarke JA. 
13 This may amount also to sex discrimination if the assumption applies to women only The dif-
fi culty is that in most cases the employer will apply the policy equally to married men. In any 
event, as argued below, such stereotype assumption is rather artifi cial.
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the court chose not to address the correctness of Boehringer,14 although it 
does show how eager the court was trying to get out of the rather artifi cial 
and narrow approach as adopted in Boehringer.15
The stereotyped assumption approach has also been invoked in the 
United Kingdom to change the basis of the claim from marital status 
discrimination to sex discrimination and hence it became unnecessary to 
address the problem of comparators in marital status discrimination. In 
Skyrail Oceanic Ltd v Coleman,16 the plaintiff was dismissed because her 
fi ance/husband worked for a rival travel agency. However, the two rival 
travel agencies had apparently had a discussion and decided that the 
plaintiff should be dismissed as the husband would probably be the bread-
winner of the family. The Court of Appeal held, by a majority, that there 
was discrimination as the decision was based on a stereotyped assump-
tion that married men were more likely than married women to be the 
primary supporters of their spouses and children. Similarly, in Horsey v 
Dyfed County Council,17 the plaintiff was denied an application to apply 
for a secondment to London to join her husband on the ground that she 
would probably not return to her job after the secondment. The Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal upheld her claim of sex discrimination on the 
ground that the decision of her employer was not based on her intention 
but on the stereotyped assumption that married women would give up 
their employment to join their husbands. Browne-Wilkinson J (as he 
then was), who delivered the judgment of the Tribunal, held that “a deci-
sion to treat a complainant in a particular way for reasons which, as an 
14 For a criticism of Boehringer, see G Rowe, “Misunderstanding Anti-Discrimination Law: The 
New South Wales Court of Appeal in Reddrop” (1986) 10 Adelaide Law Review 318. The 
learned author may not have fully distinguished two separate issues: one is whether there is 
marital status discrimination if the decision was made on the basis of mixed factors. Clarke 
JA in Waterhouse lamented that this criticism was a misreading of Boehringer: n 8 above. The 
second issue is whether marital status discrimination allows the court to take into consideration 
the circumstances and the identity of one’s spouse. This issue was not really addressed by Rowe. 
Section 31(1A) of the Anti-Discrimination Act dealt with the fi rst issue, but it has apparently 
left open the second issue. See also Neil Rees, Katherine Lindsay and Simon Rice, Australian 
Anti-Discrimination Law: Test, Cases and Meterials (Federation Press, 2008), paras 5.6–5.7.
15 It is interesting that in a subsequent case of Liseo v Canterbury City Council [1999] NSWADT 
118, the Equal Opportunity Tribunal accepted (as conceded by the respondent in that case) 
that marital status discrimination applied not merely to marital status as a concept but also to 
the marital status of a particular person. The Liseo case was regarded as representing the law 
in Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, Vol 4, para [80–305], in which it is stated that “It was accepted 
that marital status discrimination applied not merely to marital status as a concept but also to 
the marital status of a particular person …” On the other hand, the Law Commission of New 
South Wales in its Report No 92 (1999), para 5.57, took the view that it was unnecessary to 
amend the law, thereby implicitly accepting the distinction between Boehringer and Waterhouse 
and accepting that Boehringer is still good law.
16 [1981] ICR 864 at 870–871.
17 [1982] ICR 755.
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essential ingredient, contain a generalised assumption about a woman’s 
behaviour is a decision made ‘on the ground of sex’.”18 
While revealing stereotyped assumptions may sometimes shift the 
basis of the claim from marital status discrimination to sex discrimination 
and hence avoid the problem of an appropriate comparator in marital 
status discrimination, this approach may be highly artifi cial and in both 
Skyrail and Horsey cases, there was only scanty evidence of a stereotyped 
assumption, which may only be elicited by skilful cross-examination. 
The facts in these two cases were rather unique and in most cases, the 
employer would probably dismiss an employee in these circumstances 
whatever be the gender of the employee. In contrast, the Canadian Court 
adopted a less tortuous approach by recognising the absolute and relative 
nature of the concept of “marital status”.
The Canadian Approach
In B v Ontario (Human Rights Commission),19 the respondent was dis-
missed from his employment with the appellant D Ltd which was a fi rm 
owned by two brothers, Mr B and Mr C. Mr B terminated the respon-
dent’s employment after being confronted by the respondent’s daughter 
and his wife with accusations that he (Mr B) had sexually molested the 
daughter when she was a young child. The Supreme Court of Canada 
held that, given the nature of the Human Rights Code, a broad meaning 
of “marital status” and “family status” should be adopted such that they 
are broad enough to encompass circumstances where the discrimination 
results from the particular identity of the complainant’s child or spouse 
and that it is suffi cient that the individual experiences differential treat-
ment on the basis of an irrelevant personal characteristic that is enu-
merated in the grounds provided in the Ontario Human Rights Code.20 
It further held that it was unnecessary to embark on the artifi cial exer-
cise of constructing a disadvantaged sub-group to which the complain-
ant belonged in order to bring oneself within the ambit of marital status 
18 Ibid, at 761.
19 [2002] 3 SCR 403.
20 Ibid, at 429, para 57. One of the reasons relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada is that the 
Ontario Human Rights Code is aimed at protecting individuals as opposed to groups against 
discrimination (see para 40 therein). It has been held by the Hong Kong Court that freedom 
from discrimination is also a fundamental right of each individual: Equal Opportunities Commis-
sion v Director of Education [2001] 2 HKLRD 690 at paras 83–86.
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within the Code.21 After referring to s 5 of the Code that every one has a 
right to equal treatment, the Supreme Court of Canada held:22 
“By using the words ‘every person’ the statute is clearly aimed at protect-
ing individuals as opposed to groups against discrimination. Although it is 
equally clear that, in order to come under the protection of s 5(1), the dis-
crimination must be based on one of the listed grounds, this does not mean 
that the discriminatory action must be directed against an identifi able group 
subsumed within the enumerated ground. Nor does it mean that the action 
complained of must result from the stereotypical application of an attributed 
group characteristic. Such requirements are simply not found in the wording 
of s 5(1).”
The court then further explained:23
“Discrimination is not only about groups. It is also about individuals who 
are arbitrarily disadvantaged for reasons having largely to do with attributed 
stereotypes, regardless of their actual merit. While it is true that disadvanta-
geous stereotypes usually arise when characteristics are attributed to some-
one based on what people in a particular group are deemed to be capable of, 
this does not mean that when dealing with a complaint, a complainant must 
be artifi cially slotted into a group category before a claim of discrimination 
can be upheld under the Code.”
In other words, instead of focusing on a comparator, the Canadian Court 
focused on the reason for the dismissal. As long as the dismissal is based 
on one of the prohibited grounds, it does not matter if there exists a 
group with whom the complainant can be associated and compared for 
the purpose of demonstrating a difference in treatment.
The Hong Kong Approach
The distinction between the Canadian approach and the Australian 
approach seems to lie in how the court perceived the nature of discrimi-
nation legislation. The Australian Court treated the Sex Discrimina-
tion Act as a piece of ordinary legislation, and hence adopted a literal 
21 [2002] 3 SCR 403 at 429, para 56.
22 At 419, para 40.
23 At 428, para 56.
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approach to interpretation. In contrast, the Canadian Court recognised 
the special nature of anti-discrimination legislation and adopted a gener-
ous and purposive interpretation of the provision. While discrimination 
is proscribed in Hong Kong by the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, non-
discrimination is also a general principle that has been enshrined in the 
Basic Law and the Bill of Rights.24 Accordingly, it is not surprising that 
the Hong Kong Court in Wong Lai Wan Avril expressed a preference for 
a generous and purposive approach as in Canada that results in a broad 
defi nition of “marital status”.25
The court also rejected the adoption of a de facto spouse as a com-
parator.26 In the United Kingdom and Australia, the defi nition of 
“marital status” extends to cover the status of a “de facto spouse”, which 
is omitted from the defi nition of “marital status” in the Hong Kong 
legislation. As the court pointed out, this exclusion is deliberate to 
refl ect the local customs and traditional values where a “common law 
wife” does not receive any protection under the Hong Kong matrimo-
nial legislation. As “de facto spouse” is not a recognised marital status, 
and as the comparator must have a different marital status, de facto 
spouse would not, so the court appeared to suggest, be an appropriate 
comparator. This is debatable, as a de facto spouse would still have a 
status of being single, even though living with the “spouse”, and could 
hence arguably be an appropriate comparator. This again highlights 
the problem with the comparator analysis, as it is often diffi cult to 
determine, for the purpose of comparison, what the similar and mate-
rial circumstances are.27 
As the case was only at the stage of striking out on the ground of 
no reasonable cause of action, the court had not gone further to decide 
whether the dismissal could be justifi ed.
Some Ref lections
The Hong Kong Court’s decision is welcome. It better refl ects the true 
nature of anti-discrimination law, better accords with the prevailing 
24 Basic Law, Art 25; Bill of Rights, Arts 2 and 22.
25 See Equal Opportunities Commission v Director of Education [2001] 2 HKLRD 690 at 720, 
paras 79–83.
26 [2009] 5 HKC 494 at 521, para 64.
27 Purvis v New South Wales (both the majority and minority judgments) cited in M v Secretary 
for Justice [2009] 2 HKLRD 298, at paras 46–56. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for 
drawing my attention to this case.
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human rights jurisprudence, and is probably more in line with common 
sense. If the plaintiff was dismissed on the ground that she was the 
wife of another person, this must by itself be a prejudicial treatment 
on a proscribed ground which has to be justifi ed. So why should she 
be required to further show that other wives were treated similarly? To 
search for a comparator in such circumstances would be bound to be a 
futile exercise. 
The stereotyped assumptions approach adopted in both Canada 
and Australia may in appropriate cases provide an alternative route 
to get around the sometimes artifi cial search for a comparator, which 
may be compelled by a mechanical application of the “but for test”.28 
The effect of the Hong Kong Court’s decision is that it shifts the focus 
in discrimination cases from searching for a suitable comparator to an 
examination of the circumstances of the alleged discriminatory act. 
This f lexible approach may have wider implications in the proof of dis-
crimination in other types of discrimination cases. This is not to say 
that the court could now abandon the well-established “but for” test. 
In general, the “but-for” test is still helpful in elucidating the discrimi-
nation factor. However, the “but-for” test is a test of causation. It does 
not mandate a comparator approach in all cases. It is only a tool to 
elucidate causal relationship and should not be applied mechanically or 
be allowed to obscure the real issue in discrimination cases. After all, 
the right to equality is an individual right. The fundamental question is 
whether a claimant is singled out for treatment on prohibited grounds, 
not whether she can be artifi cially slotted into a group category. This is 
particularly relevant where the identity of the appropriate comparator 
is in dispute, in which case it may be more appropriate to concentrate 
on the reason why a complainant is treated in the way as she was. In 
this regard, the advice of Lord Nicholls for a common sense approach is 
most opportune:29
“This analysis seems to me to point to the conclusion that employment 
tribunals may sometimes be able to avoid arid and confusing disputes about 
the identifi cation of the appropriate comparator by concentrating primar-
ily on why the claimant was treated as she was. Was it on the proscribed 
ground which is the foundation of the application? That will call for an 
28 See Lord Goff in R v Birmingham City Counsel ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1989] 
1 AC 1155, which was followed by our Court of Final Appeal in Secretary for Justice v Chan Wah 
[2000] 3 HKLRD 641 at 656, per Li CJ.
29 Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 11 at 31, paras 11–12.
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examination of all the facts of the case. Or was it for some other reason? 
If the latter, the application fails. If the former, there will usually be no 
diffi culty in deciding whether the treatment, afforded to the claimant on 
the proscribed ground, was less favourable than was or would have been 
afforded to others. The most convenient and appropriate way was to tackle 
the issues arising on any discrimination application must always depend 
upon the nature of the issues and all the circumstances of the case. There 
will be case where it is convenient to decide the less favourable treatment 
issue fi rst. But, for the reason set out above, when formulating their deci-
sions employment tribunals may fi nd it helpful to consider whether they 
should postpone determining the less favourable treatment issue until after 
they have decided why the treatment was afforded to the claimant. Adopt-
ing this course would have simplifi ed the issues, and assisted in their resolu-
tion, in the present case.” 
This passage lends support to a holistic approach that it is sometimes 
undesirable to mechanically compartmentalise the treatment of dis-
crimination into establishing the factors on which differential treat-
ment is based and the justifi cation for such differential treatment. 
While conceptually these are two separate issues which could work 
well when a comparator is readily available, the two issues would inter-
mingle with one another when a comparator group is not readily avail-
able. In this particular case, when it is diffi cult to fi nd a hypothetical 
comparator who can be said to be in materially similar circumstances, 
the questions whether the plaintiff was treated differentially because of 
her marital status to her particular spouse and whether such differen-
tial treatment could be justifi ed could not be easily disentangled, and 
it makes perfect sense to consider the two issues together, which seems 
to be the prevalent approach adopted in both the United Kingdom and 
Canada.
Hiring and Dismissal Policy Relating to Spouses
This brings us to the tricky issue whether a hiring or dismissal policy 
based on the fact that one’s spouse has worked in the same company 
(in the case of hiring) and has been dismissed (in the case of dismissal), 
or that one’s spouse works in a rival company (in both hiring and dis-
missal), could be justifi ed. If it is a case of direct discrimination, there 
will be discrimination unless the dismissal can fall within one of the 
statutory exceptions, the nearest of which is genuine occupational quali-
fi cation which is hardly applicable in such situations. However, in most 
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cases, the reason for discrimination may not be apparent,30 or the rea-
sons given would be a general concern of disclosure of confi dential or 
sensitive trade information, which disclosure may be a result of a delib-
erate decision in breach of an employee’s duty of confi dentiality, or an 
inadvertent result arising from daily casual conversation between two 
closely related persons. Thus, it begs the question whether the decision 
was made on the ground of marital status in the fi rst place. It is also 
probable that hard evidence of disclosure is usually not available, and on 
many occasions, the decision not to recruit or the decision to dismiss is 
made not even on any reasonable suspicion of disclosure but a mere risk 
of possible disclosure. 
A few observations can be made here. First, each case has to be 
decided on its own merits. Therefore, a general employment policy 
which is to be applied irrespective of the circumstances of each case 
is likely to be challenged. The job nature, the nature of information 
involved, the seniority of the position occupied (or to be occupied), 
the size of the company, the ease of access to confi dential or sensitive 
information, the safeguard system, one’s work attitude, and one’s past 
employment record and performance will be some of the relevant fac-
tors. In this regard, hiring may be different from dismissal in that some 
companies may adopt an anti-nepotism policy to avoid a confl ict of 
interest or favouritism, which seems to be a legitimate concern. Such 
consideration is less likely to be relevant in the case of dismissal when 
the main concern is more likely to be disclosure of confi dential or sensi-
tive information. Secondly, a decision will be on a safer ground if it is 
made on the basis of actual evidence or reasonable suspicion of disclo-
sure of confi dential or sensitive information. In the case of a reasonable 
suspicion, it will be necessary to show objective grounds other than the 
spousal relationship to justify the suspicion. 
Thirdly, the justifi cation is protection of confi dential or sensitive 
information. It is therefore necessary to show that the person involved 
has access to confi dential or sensitive information. What constitutes 
confi dential or sensitive information may vary from trade to trade. Sen-
sitive information may include valuable information that is not readily 
available to the outsiders but which may not necessarily be confi dential 
in nature. One has to exercise common sense in determining this issue 
and will have to bear in mind that sometimes information which is 
neutral on its face may be of great signifi cance to a rival company when 
30 While it is true that so long as marital status is one of the reasons for the differential treatment 
it will be regarded as marital status discrimination (s 4, SDO), in most cases whether marital 
status plays a part in the decision making is at best speculative or highly contested.
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it is put together with other information in the hands of the rivalry. 
On the other hand, confi dential or sensitive information should not 
be extended to cover information that is readily available in the public 
domain or readily available to a rival company in the same trade or 
business.
Fourthly, a decision will be dubious if it is purely based on a mere risk 
of disclosure of confi dential or sensitive information to one’s spouse. Such 
a decision may involve a stereotype assumption relating to a particular 
gender, as in Waterhouse, Skyrail and Horsey above. However, evidence of 
such a stereotype assumption is unlikely to be readily available, and will 
most likely come to light only upon skilful cross-examination. This may 
pose particular diffi culty to an unrepresented litigant or a legal aid body 
in deciding whether legal assistance should be granted. On the other 
hand, even without evidence of such stereotype assumption, it is open 
to the court to evaluate critically how likely the risk is and what basis 
there is for the assumption of such a risk. It may also be necessary to bear 
in mind that on the one hand, employment is essentially a relationship 
of trust, and on the other hand, the law of discrimination is to eradi-
cate unfounded prejudice. The nature of the job, the nature of informa-
tion involved, the ease of access to sensitive or confi dential information 
and the possibility or practicability of alternative posting or reorganising 
one’s job duties or portfolio will be of paramount importance in such case. 
A vigilant scrutiny would be called for if the decision is based on nothing 
more than the existence of a spousal relationship.
Conclusion
Decisions on hiring or dismissal involving a spouse are a tricky area which 
touches on sensitive issues of trust and human relationship. On the one 
hand, a person should be treated on his or her own merits and not who 
he or she has married to. On the other hand, there could be legitimate 
concerns on the part of the employers. No formulaic approach would be 
appropriate and the court will have to exercise great caution, sensitivity 
and common sense in the light of the circumstances of each individual 
case. A mechanical approach insisting on fi nding a suitable comparator 
may not work. It is also important for the employer to show that the 
concern is genuine and based on reasonable grounds and not a matter 
of prejudice, which is what most discrimination cases are about. At the 
end of the day, the court will have to fi nd a balance between upholding 
the dignity of a person and the legitimate concern for protection of one’s 
business. A holistic approach may be desirable and permissible if there is 
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a dispute whether marital status played any role in the relevant human 
resources decision, or when the challenge was based on indirect discrimi-
nation or on general equality protection under the Basic Law or the Bill of 
Rights. Unfortunately, this type of holistic analysis may not be permitted 
by the Sex Discrimination Ordinance when it is admitted or proved that 
marital status is a factor in making the human resources decisions, that 
is, direct marital status discrimination. In such circumstances, when the 
differential treatment is justifi able, the court may well have to fi nd itself 
engaged in such a tortuous comparator analysis in order to avoid a fi nding 
of discrimination under the Ordinance. 
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